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Abstract
We propose a simple quality-ladder model with heterogeneous agents differing in their skills and wealth
endowment to explain the persistence of barriers to entry in new democracies. In the model agents vote
for a rate of redistribution and for the level of barriers to entry, which protect the incumbent firms from
competition with new entrants. We show that even if a society democratizes, under certain conditions this
leads only to the rise of redistribution, rather than to the elimination of barriers to entry. We show that
this argument is particularly relevant for countries with a low level of human capital and high inequality in
incomes and in skills.
JEL Classification: O33, P16
Keywords: barriers to entry, majority voting, quality-ladders model, income inequality, skills inequality,
persistence of economic institutions
1 Introduction
For the last thirty years a large group of countries in Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe have
democratized their political regimes. Potentially this transition towards democracy could be a transition
towards prosperity, if the diffusion of political power provides conditions for the wide support of inclusive
economic institutions. At the same time, in many new democracies inefficient economic institutions usually
persist.
The empirical evidence related to the effect of changes in political regimes from dictatorship to democ-
racy on institutions and economic growth is contradictory. According to Barro (1996), democratization does
not lead to higher economic growth and a study of Polterovich and Popov (2005) show that democratization
even leads to lower growth in countries with poor institutions of law and order. According to Acemoglu et al.
⇤Laboratory of Macroeconomic Analysis, National Research University Higher School of Economics; dveselov@hse.ru
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(2014) democratization does cause positive changes in GDP per capita, but only in the long run. They also
find that the effect of democratization is stronger for countries which start out with higher levels of education.
One way to explain the effect of democratization on economic institutions and growth is to consider its
effect on barriers to entry. Barriers to entry, which protect incumbents from competition with new entrants,
is one of the form of economic institution which creates rent for narrow groups of agents at the costs of
economic efficiency. Barriers to entry can be measured simply as costs of creating a new firm (Djankov et
al., 2002). At the same time, a broader definition of barriers to entry includes also the differences in credit
conditions, legal environment, property rights protection between incumbents and new entrants (Acemoglu,
2008).
In autocracies the costs of entry (creating a new business and dealing with licenses) are on average
higher than in democracies (Djankov, 2008). At the same time, differences between de jure democratic
countries are very high in terms of the costs of creating business or business environment. For example,
South Korea and Argentina have been democratic countries since the end of 1980s according to Polity IV
index, however, the place in the ranking of Doing Business Indicators (2012) is 8 for South Korea and 124
for Argentina (in Starting the business ranking, 8 and 154).
Acemoglu, Robinson (2008) explain the persistence of inefficient institutions in new democracies
through the distribution of de facto political power. They introduce a notion of ’captured’ democracy in
which, despite the presence of de jure democratic political institutions, economic institutions remain extrac-
tive. According to their argument, at the onset of democratization political elites are capable of investing in
alternative ways of influencing policy-making, that is lobbying, agenda manipulation etc. and, thus, make a
strong opposition to the changes in economic institutions.
In this paper we propose a theoretical model which provides an alternative mechanism for the expla-
nation of persistence of institutions which impede economic growth (in our case, the barriers to entry) and
poor economic performance in new democracies. We show that even if de facto political power is distributed
more equally under certain conditions the barriers to entry persist over time.
According to Schumpeter (1943) the central feature of democracy is political competition and the
free entry of new parties into the political process. Polity IV database measures the level of democracy by
estimating the competitiveness of state elections and their openness to outsiders as well as the existence of
check and balances which prevent the concentration of political power. In our approach democracy is also a
dictate of the majority. Political equilibrium is defined as majority core voting equilibrium (as, for example,
in Ferna´ndes, Rogerson (1995)), in which a stable coalition of agents choose the policy. All other agents,
which do not belong to the stable majority coalition, do not influence social decision-making. Therefore, the
difference between authoritarian regimes and democracy is simply the difference between the set of agents,
which have the possibility to effect social choice. Democratization means also the extension of franchise and
broader distribution of political power between agents.
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In a single-issue election with one-peaked voter preferences, if two parties compete for the major-
ity of voters, then they optimally locate at the median voter (unique core point). At the same time, in a
multi-issue election there is the problem of the intransitivity of majority preferences. To solve this problem,
modern multi-dimensional voting models consider the institutional arrangements which restrict the possibili-
ties of coalition formation and, thus, solve the problem of intransitivity of collective preferences (Levy, 2005,
Ferna´ndez, Levy, 2008), or use probabilistic voting models (f.e. Bernasconi, Profeta, 2012). In our set-up
we analyze the simple majority core voting equilibrium and do not restrict coalition formation. At the same
time, following Krussell, Rios-Rull (1995), Parente, Zao (2006) we model the barriers to entry as a binary
variable. We also restrict our attention to the one-period version of the model with agents maximizing their
current pay-offs. Despite the presence of the cycling problem we show that in most cases a majority core
voting equilibrium exists and is unique.
In our model a society consists of capitalists (shareholders of incumbent firms) and workers. Workers
are heterogeneous in their human capital level. Some workers have also the entrepreneurial talent, which
helps to organize new firms. Barriers to entry prevent the creation of new firms and, thus, permit incumbents
to escape an R&D contest with new entrants. At the beginning of the period agents vote for the set of policies
in a two-dimensional policy space, including the profit tax rate and the level of barriers to entry. The profit tax
is collected from all firms and is redistributed to workers. In a free-entry regime as new firms carry the costs
of investment in technological adoption there is a threshold level of profit tax rate, for which investments in
new technology for them are profitable. We show that the policy preferences of high-skilled workers and
low-skilled workers differ: high-skilled workers prefer zero entry barriers and relatively low redistribution
rate, whereas low-skilled workers prefer high redistribution rate and high entry barriers. The shareholders of
incumbent firms (capitalists) vote for the barriers to entry and zero redistribution rate.
The main result of the model is that democratization does not necessary lead to the elimination of
barriers to entry. The high redistribution no-entry policy could be a stable political outcome supported by
the majority consisting of the shareholders of incumbents firms (capitalists) and low-skilled workers. The
political equilibrium is determined by the average skill level, de-facto political power distribution (the extent
of democratization) and by the level of inequality in skills and pre-tax incomes. In an economy with a high
average level of skills and low inequality of skills and income, all workers prefer zero barriers to entry and,
hence, the democratization leads to zero entry barriers, enhances competition and growth.
The model explains the tendency towards the politics of populism in new democracies. Democratiza-
tion can even lower growth if it does not lead to the changes in the economic institutions and only increases
the redistribution, which is potentially distortionary. Our results also provide the theoretical basis for the
empirical finding of Acemoglu et al. (2014) stating that the level of education influences positively the ex-
pected benefits from democratization. In the model the persistence of barriers to entry in new democracies is
possible only for low skilled economies.
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The model is capable of explaining the phenomenon, according to which the middle class can be
political outsiders. In the two-dimensional case, a higher rate of skill inequality increases the probability of
coalition formation between the low-skilled workers and capitalists. The winning coalition does not include
the middle class (high-skilled workers) and the equilibrium level of redistribution is determined by lower
class agents. This fact explains the empirical finding of Scervini (2012) stating that the middle class does not
play a decisive role in redistribution, as postulated by the median-voter hypothesis. Our analysis also shows
that the rise in income inequality not only increases the preferences towards higher redistribution, but also
decreases the political support for free-entry policy, as the gains from economic growth become distributed
more unequally.
In Schumpeterian growth models (Aghion, Howitt, 1992, 1998) the patent system is a necessary insti-
tute for the existence of innovations and growth. In the case of the free copying of new technology potential
innovators have zero interest to invest in new projects as the expected profits from these projects is always
negative because of the free-rider problem. Therefore, patent protection is needed to assure a positive rate
of innovations and growth. Here, we focus the barriers the in research sector. Barriers to entry in our model
protect incumbent firms from a R&D contest with new entrants, and hence, in some cases, discourage tech-
nological progress.
The paper is structured in the following way, section 2 describes the basic framework of the model,
the innovation race between incumbents and new entrants and the effects of political choice on the results of
this race. Section 3 describes types and preferences of agents, section 4 discusses the political equilibrium
and the basic results. Section 5 analyzes several extensions of the baseline model, section 6 concludes.
2 Basic framework
The economy is inhabited by one-period lived agents, who maximize their current income. All agents are
divided into N capitalists and L workers. Each capitalist is an owner of one incumbent firm, which produces
an intermediate input from the final good. Each incumbent firm produces a unique version of an intermediate
input and is a monopoly in its market and gets a profit ⇡. Workers are employed only in the production of the
final goods, which are produced in a competitive market using labor and intermediate inputs. The final good
is used as a consumption good, as a raw material in the production of intermediate inputs and as an input
in innovation activities1. Each worker supplies inelastically 1 unit of labor in a perfectly competitive labor
market. Workers differ in the level of skills. The worker k gets the wage whk, where w is the wage rate per
unit of skills and hk is the individual skills level. The distribution of skills is exogenous and constant over
time.
1The general equilibrium framework of the model, which is similar to Howitt, Mayer-Foulke (2005) framework of schumpeterian
growth model, is presented in Appendix A
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We assume that capitalists have no labor skills and so, they do not make an occupational choice, they
only run incumbent firms. At the same time, a given number of workers have entrepreneurial skills, potential
entrepreneurs have the capabilities to create new firms, producing intermediate inputs, and competing on
the market with incumbent firms. For simplicity, we assume that workers with entrepreneurial skills are
homogenous and so they have the same level of skills.
At the beginning of the period all agents make political decisions about the level of redistribution and
the level of barriers to entry. The policy set is two-dimensional. In the political process a society chooses
simultaneously the entry regime, to block the entry of new firms (B) or not to block (NB) and a profit tax
rate ⌧ , which provides the redistribution from capitalists to workers. All collected profit taxes are distributed
between workers as lump-sum transfers.
After the elections, firms make investment decisions. The patent race between incumbents and new
entrants is represented in figure 1. Incumbent firms have the possibility to invest in R&D projects with a given
rate of return. The rate of return on projects is the same between firms. By investing c⇡ units of final good2
the incumbent firm gets the profit  ⇡(1   ⌧) at the end of the period, where  1, c are exogenous constants,
measuring the size and costs of innovation and ⌧ is the profit tax rate.
If incumbent firms do not invest in the projects, they risk being replaced by new entrants. For each
sector there is one3 potential entrepreneur from the class of workers, who is able to invest in the same project
with a given probability of success    1, where   measures the level of entrepreneurial talents of potential
innovators. We assume also that   is sufficiently high, such that the entry threat would be credible.
Assumption 1.    >    1
If the new entrant is successful, the incumbent will loose the market in the competition with a new
more efficient entrant. Incumbents have first-mover advantage, if they invest in the project, they are immune
to competition.
As soon as investment projects are realized, firms produce goods and pay wages to workers. In order
to limit the redistribution possibilities, we follow Acemoglu (2008) by supposing that firms can hide their
profits from taxation. The costs of hiding is   per unit of profits. This assumption guarantees that the actual
tax rate does not exceed  , in the opposite case firms will hide profits and the total amount of tax incomes
will drop to zero.
The timing of the model can be summarized in the following way:
2We assume here that the costs of innovations are proportional to the profit rate which is also proportional to the current complexity
of innovation. The hypothesis that the costs of innovations rise proportionally to the complexity of innovations is typical for the quality-
ladders models. (f.e Aghion, Howitt (1998)) There is no credit market imperfections and projects are realized if their net present value
is positive.
3The model can be easy extended for the case of multiple competitors. The results rest the same. The change of exogenous costs of
innovations for entrepreneurs also does not alter the results.
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Figure 1: Patent race
Note: The pay-off of incumbents and new entrants is represented in round brackets. Investments can be
positive (I) or zero (NI). The white arrow underlines the fact that new entrants are capable of making
investments only in the NB-regime.
1. The entry regime (B,NB) and a tax rate ⌧ are chosen in the political process. This decision is not
renegotiable;
2. A patent race between incumbents and new entrants occurs;
3. Firms produce goods and pay wages;
4. All producers decide whether to hide profits;
5. Redistribution and consumption occurs.
Definition 1. Economic equilibrium. Given the policy variables (the entry regime and the tax rate,⌧ ) the
economic equilibrium is a sequence of investment decisions of incumbent firms and potential entrants and a
hiding decision of firms, as well as wage rate (w), profit rate (⇡) and transfer payments (Tr), such that all
firms maximize their after-tax profits and market clearing conditions for the labor market, the intermediate
input markets and the final goods market hold. The budget constraint is balanced (the sum of tax payments
equals the sum of transfer payments).
In Appendix A we show that in an economic equilibrium the wage rate and profit rate are proportional
to the size of technology, which is measured by the average quality of intermediate products. We also show
that if investment projects are realized the quality of intermediate inputs increases by   and income per capita,
profits and wages increases also by  . This is a standard result for Schumpeterian growth models. Let’s find
now the equilibrium investment decision of incumbent firms and new entrants, given the policy variables.
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In the economic equilibrium investment decisions of incumbent firms depend on the pre-tax rate of
return on projects, which is determined by the exogenous costs and the size of innovations (c,  ) and the
policy variables (the entry regime, the tax rate). In a patent race game (fig. 2) as soon as the following
inequality holds
 (1  ⌧)  c   1  ⌧, (1)
the rate of return on investments is so high, that incumbent firms will invest in the project even in the B-
regime. In this case the type of the entry regime does not influence the economic outcomes (fig.2, area 1). In
the opposite case two scenarios are possible. Either the entry threat is credible or not. If the expected profits
for new entrants are negative
  (1  ⌧)  c < 0 (2)
even in the free-entry case the entry threat is not credible. The investment rate is zero as incumbent firms also
do not make investments (fig.2, area 3). If the entry threat is credible (fig.2, area 2), incumbents always will
use their first mover advantage and invest in projects, to avoid the possibility of being replaced by the new
entrant (escape competition effect)4. To show this, let us compare the expected profits of incumbent firms in
the case when the entry threat is credible. Incumbent firms will use their first mover advantage, if
 (1  ⌧)  c   (1   )(1  ⌧). (3)
As soon as the entry threat is credible, c <   (1  ⌧). Under this constraint, the inequality (3) always holds5
.
Figure 2 describes three economic equilibria of the model. In the areas 1 and 3 the entry regime does
not effect the investment level. In the area 2, incumbents make investments only in the NB-regime to escape
competition with new entrants. We assume that    >    1 and so, the probability of innovations for new
entrants is sufficiently high such that the area 2 is not an empty set. In the opposite case, the entry regime will
not have any influence on firms decisions and the political problem will reduce to a one-dimensional case of
distributional conflict.
The rise of the profit tax rate decreases the expected rate of return of investment and could influence
the firms incentives to invest. Let define ⌧ 0 as the threshold rate of profit tax: if ⌧ > ⌧0 new entrants do not
4Aghion et al.(2007) show that increased competition even lowers the incentives for innovation for firms, which lag behind the
technological frontier. For these firms the presence of new more efficient entrants decreases the potential rent from the new innovation.
We do not consider this effect in this model as we concentrate our attention to the formation of the entry barriers. Even if incumbent
firms lag behind they will also oppose the policy, which eliminates the barriers to entry, which is consistent with our model
5One can argue that investment costs of research projects are different for incumbent firms and new entrants. In this case different
scenarios are possible. If the research costs for new entrants are relatively high, only incumbent firms have incentives to invest, therefore,
the political problem becomes one-dimensional as the entry regime does not effect the firms’ economic decisions. If the research costs
for new entrants are relatively low than the research costs of incumbent firms, potential entrants are very efficient relative to incumbents,
which will not use their first mover advantage in the patent race. This case is considered in the complement paper, Veselov (2013)
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Figure 2: Economic equilibrium
Note: The entry regime effects the investment rate only in the area 2
invest in new projects even if barriers to entry are absent. From (2)
⌧ 0 = 1  c/  . (4)
We also define the threshold tax rate b⌧ , such that for ⌧ < b⌧ the incumbent firms make investment even in the
B-regime. From (1) b⌧ = 1  c/(    1). (5)
By assumption b⌧ is always less than ⌧ 0 and so, the policy problem is two-dimensional.
2.1 Agents political preferences
Now we specify the agents political preferences in a two-dimensional policy space {J,⌧ J}, where J 2
{B,NB}, ⌧B 2 [0, 1], ⌧NB 2 [0, ⌧ 0]. These preferences determine the political behavior of agents and the
endogenous choice of policy variables, which will be specified in the next section. We define the NB-regime
as the regime with zero entry barriers and also the credible entry threat (⌧  ⌧ 0).
2.1.1 Capitalists’ preferences
The capitalists’ pay-off consists of the after-tax profits of incumbent firms, which are distributed to capitalists
as dividends. Capitalists pay-off in the B-regime equals
V Bc = max{(1  ⌧)⇡; [ (1  ⌧)  c]⇡}. (6)
8
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In the B-regime incumbent firms freely chose whether to invest in the project or not and the capitalists pay-off
is the highest possible gain from these two alternatives. In the NB-regime incumbent firms always use their
first-mover advantage and invest in projects. Therefore, the capitalists’ pay-off in the NB-regime equals
V NBc = [ (1  ⌧)  c]⇡. (7)
The formulas (6), (7) hold for ⌧   . If ⌧ >   the incumbent firms will hide profits and the capitalists’
pay-off will be the same as in the case of ⌧ =  .
Figures 3, 4 describe the capitalists pay-offs in the B- and NB-regimes for different level of profit tax
(⌧ ). If the rate of return on projects is relatively low, such that c >     1, (fig.3), the B-regime is always
better for capitalists, than the NB-regime. As soon as the entry threat is credible, incumbent firms will invest
in the project only to escape competition and so they get lower profits, than in the B-regime.
Figure 3: Capitalists pay-off if c >     1 and ⌧ 0 <  
If the rate of return on projects is sufficiently high c <   1 (fig. 4) for a low tax rate ⌧  b⌧ capitalists
are indifferent between the two entry regimes, as in both regimes incumbent firms will invest in the project
and get the same level of profits. For ⌧ > b⌧ the capitalists prefer the B-regime.
Figure 4: Capitalists pay-off if   > 1 + c, b⌧ < ⌧0 <  
In all cases capitalists bliss-point is (B,0). They are indifferent between (NB,0) and (B,0) if ⌧  b⌧ .
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2.1.2 Workers’ preferences
The workers pay-off consists of wages and the lump-sum transfers. For ⌧ <   the firms do not hide their
profits and the lump-sum transfers for each worker equal ⌧⇡N/L. If incumbent firms do not invest in new
projects (the B regime with ⌧ > b⌧ ) workers pay-off (V NIk ) equals
V NIk = whk + ⌧⇡N/L. (8)
In the B- and NB-regime with ⌧  b⌧ , investment projects are realized and wages, profits and transfer pay-
ments increase proportionally by  6. Therefore, the workers pay-offs V Ik equal
V Ik =  [whk + ⌧⇡N/L]. (9)
We assume that the distribution of levels of skills is fixed and workers are not capable of changing their
individual skills level. Higher skilled workers get higher salaries, but also benefit more from the technological
progress. Therefore, there is a potential disagreement between the high-skilled workers and low-skilled
workers, who consider the transfer payments as the main source of income. The formal analysis of this claim
is presented in Proposition 1.
Let define h as the average level of human capital within workers, and ↵ is the ratio of total profits to
total wages.
↵ = ⇡N/(whL). (10)
The next proposition follows
Proposition 1. Workers bliss points
1. For high rate of return c <  (     ) all workers prefer the NB-regime with the highest possible
redistribution rate ⌧ = min{⌧ 0,  }.
2. For intermediate rate of return  (   ) < c <    the bliss point for the group of relatively high skilled
workers with hk   h0 is (NB,⌧ 0), for the rest of workers (hk < h0) the bliss point is (B,  ), where
h0 = h↵(      + c/ )/(    1). (11)
3. For low rate of return (c >   ) the entry is not possible and all workers prefer the maximum redistri-
bution rate (B,  ).
Proof. If ⌧ 0     it is straightforward to see that all workers prefer maximum possible redistribution rate  
and the NB-regime. If ⌧ 0 <   there is a trade-off between the free-entry regime with a lower redistribution
6see Appendix A for the explanation of this result in the general equilibrium set-up
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rate and the no-entry regime with a high redistribution rate. The bliss point for workers is either (NB,⌧ 0) or
(B,  ). Let us compare the workers pay-off in each case. From (8) and (9)
Vk(NB,⌧
0) =  [whk + ⌧ 0⇡N/L], (12)
Vk(B,  ) = whk +  ⇡N/L. (13)
Workers prefer (NB,⌧ 0) policy only if
 [whk + ⌧
0⇡N/L] > whk +  ⇡N/L. (14)
Dividing the inequality (14) by wh we get
 [hk/h+ ⌧
0↵] > hk/h+  ↵. (15)
The inequality (15) can be represented as
(    1)hk/h > (    ⌧ 0 )↵. (16)
Substituting ⌧ 0 to the equation (16) we get
(    1)hk/h > (      + c/ )↵. (17)
For c <  (     ) the inequality (17) holds for every positive hk. For c >    the investment rate is always
zero and all workers prefer the maximum redistribution policy. In the intermediate case there is a threshold
level of human capital h0, which divides agents into two groups, the first one (h < h0) prefers B-regime with
high redistribution rate   and the second (h   h0) prefers (NB,⌧ 0) policy.
The result of proposition 1 is illustrated in figures 5, 6. We define two groups of workers of a size
L1, L2, with the identical within-group bliss points. As soon as the net gains from technological progress
concentrate mostly in the hands of firm-owners and high-skilled workers, the group of relatively low-skilled
workers (L1) prefers the B-regime with the maximum redistribution rate. The group of relatively skilled
workers (L2) prefer a lower rate of redistribution and the free-entry regime with positive investments.
The size of both groups depends on the skills distribution between workers. From (17) the more
skewed the human capital distribution is, the higher the number of supporters of the B-regime between work-
ers. A higher share of wages in total revenues (lower ↵) decreases the gain from redistribution, but increases
the gain from economic growth for all workers, and, finally, increases the number of supporters of the NB-
regime between workers. The rate of return of projects also matters. A higher   or lower c also increases the
11
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Figure 5: Low skilled workers (L1) pay-off, hk < h0
Figure 6: High-skilled workers (L2) pay-off, hk > h0
number of workers, supporting the free-entry regime.
3 Political equilibrium
In this section we study how political regimes influence the economic behaviour of agents. The main goal
is to analyze the effect of democratization on political and economic outcomes. A perfect democracy is a
political regime, in which de facto political power is equalized between all agents. The total number of votes,
therefore, equals N  + L. By de facto political power we mean the number of real votes belonging to each
agent. Let   measure de facto political power of capitalists, such that each capitalist has   votes,     1.
Democratization in this case leads to the extension of the franchise to workers as their relative number of
votes increases. If   = 1 each agent has one vote, which is a perfect democracy case. For   > L/N
capitalists are decisive voters and a political regime is an oligarchy7
7The question, which is beyond the scope of this analysis, is the question about endogenous democratization. Acemoglu, Robin-
son (2005) proposed a game-theoretical approach for analysis of democratization process. In their view, inequality in incomes and
redistribution conflict between poor and rich stimulate the poor agents to strife for democracy. In their model elites deliberately chose
democratization to avoid revolution and also to solve a dynamic inconsistency problem. If democratization does not happen, there is no
device to commit credibly redistribution in future
12
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Definition 2. Majority core voting equilibrium. A political equilibrium is a combination of an entry regime
J⇤ = {B,NB} and a tax rate, such that there is no a strict majority of voters, who prefer another feasible
combination {J,⌧ J} to J⇤.
During the transition to democracy political power diffuses to larger group of voters, therefore, cap-
italists loose the dominant political power   < L/N and, by definition of political equilibrium, in order to
influence policy outcomes they need to form a stable winning coalition with workers. A potential effect of
democratization on barriers to entry, redistribution and investments is summarized below
Case 1. One-dimensional conflict.
1.1. The highest rate of return (c <     1).
In this case all workers prefer the NB-regime with a maximum possible redistribution rate (  for
  < ⌧ 0, or ⌧ 0 in the opposite case). The highest rate of return guarantees that even in an oligarchy incumbent
firms make investments. Democratization results in more redistribution, but does not influence the investment
rate, which is positive for both regimes.
This case describes democratization in growth-miracle countries, especially in East Asian countries
like South Korea or Japan. At the beginning of a take-off even authoritarian regimes in these countries were
characterized by high growth rates. The transition to democracy does not have a large influence on growth
rates and business environment indicators.
2.2. The lowest rate of return, c >   .
This is a poverty trap case, even a decrease in barriers to entry does not provide incentives to invest in
projects. All workers prefer (B,  ) policy and all capitalists prefer (B, 0) policy. There is a one-dimensional
distributional conflict between capitalists and workers. This case describes the democratization process in the
least-developed countries, which is usually connected with redistribution of wealth and incomes without any
specific changes of economic institutions.
Case 2: Two-dimensional conflict.
The policy space is two dimensional for an intermediate level of a rate of return     1 < c <   . In
this case two scenarios of democratization are possible. In the first one changes of political institutions lead
to the elimination of entry barriers. If c <  (     ) all workers have an identical bliss-point (NB,⌧ 0) and
the transition to democracy induces the transformation of the entry regime, which influences positively the
investment rate, while capitalists prefers (B, 0) regime. A new democracy is consolidated in the sense that
there is no conflict of interest within workers. Even if a democratic regime is imperfect, and each capitalist
has larger de facto political power, than an individual worker, workers constitute an encompassing majority
which have a dominant political power.
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However, for c >  (     ) there are already three groups of agents with different bliss-points: capi-
talists prefer (B, 0) policy, relatively high-skilled workers prefer (NB,⌧ 0) and relatively low-skilled workers
prefer (B,  ). Under these conditions there is a second possibility of democratization, which is related to
populism8.
As soon as there is a disagreement between workers relative to their preferred policy a majority coali-
tion under certain conditions include the richest group of society (capitalists) and the poorest group of society
(low-skilled workers). This claim is formally proved in the next proposition.
Let us define hkm as the level of skills of the worker who simultaneously belongs to a minimum
majority coalition of capitalists and the least-skilled workers, and also has a maximum level of skills within
the members of this coalition.
Proposition 2. Let consider the case, when L1,L2, N is less than one half of the voters. Three political
outcomes are possible.
a) {B,  } is a majority core equilibrium, which is supported by the coalition of capitalists and the least-
skilled workers. This happens if the distribution of skills is highly skewed, democratization is partial and the
ratio of total profits to total wages(↵) is sufficiently high such that the following inequality holds
(    1)hkm/h↵< 1 + c   , (18)
and   2 ( 1,  2),  1 = (    1)hkm/h+  ⌧ 0,  2 = 1 + c+ c/ 
b) There is no a stable equilibrium if condition (18) holds and   >  2.
c) In all other cases {NB,⌧ 0} is a majority core equilibrium.
Proof. see Appendix B
In most of the cases the political equilibrium exists and is unique. From the proposition 2, there exists
a simple condition which guarantees the existence and the uniqueness of political equilibrium
  <    + 1   . (19)
In the case of three groups of voters, If   is high, such that the condition (19) is violated, each majority
coalition of voters is unstable. We assume that the inequality (19) holds, therefore, the political equilibrium
always exists. Figure 7 summarizes an equilibrium political outcome iwhich depends of the type of political
regime and the rate of return on projects. From proposition 2 we find conditions, under which democratization
does not effect barriers to entry and only leads to a rise of redistribution.
8We define populism as a policy, which does not eliminate the barriers for entry ans does not promote a rise of incomes, but reduces
an income inequality through redistribution. In this set-up there is a trade-off between inequality and growth and a social optimum
depends on a type of social preferences as well as relative weights of inequality and incomes in the social preferences. Thus, populistic
policies sacrifices growth to promote equality and can be in some cases an efficient policy
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Figure 7: The political equilibria
Note: For c <  (     ) all workers prefer the NB-regime. For  (     ) < c <    there is a conflict of
interest within workers. The area (B,  ) becomes larger, if skills distribution between workers becomes
more unequal or a share of capitalists income in total revenue increases
We show at the end of Appendix A that the costs of the project (c) are negatively related with the
average level of skills, which is exogenous in our model. In the next corollary, we consider only the effect of
changes in the level of skills, other things equal
Corollary 1. It exists a threshold average skills level (h⇤), such that in an economy with high-skilled labor
force (h   h⇤) democratization always leads to the elimination of barriers to entry, in an economy with
low-skilled labor force (h < h
⇤
) barriers to entry remain persistent if 1) democratization is only partial or
2) the inequality in human capital distribution is high or 3) the relative share of wages in total income is low.
To clarify this result let us consider a numerical example in which there is no consensus within workers
and so, the level of average human capital is sufficiently low. Suppose that, the distribution of human capital
between workers is approximated by the log-normal distribution. We set   = 1.5,   = 0.8, c = 0.78, assuring
that ⌧ 0 = 0.35. We set also   = 0.6 and ↵ = 1/2. The ratio of the number of capitalists to the number of
workers (N/L) equals 1/10. Figure 8 describes political outcomes depending on two main factors, the type of
political regime ( ) and the level of inequality in skills, which is measured by the ratio of an average level of
skills to the median level of skills (h/hmed).
A partial democratization leads to the formation of a coalition between capitalists and the lowest
skilled workers (area L1 + N ). Capitalists in this case agree to the maximum redistribution of profits ( ) to
avoid competition of incumbents firms with new entrants. Low-skilled workers also support this policy, as
they prefer to vote for the maximum redistribution, rather then to support low-redistribution, free-entry case.
Even in a perfect democracy the NB-regime is not realized in the political equilibrium if an inequality of skills
or an inequality of pre-tax incomes between capitalists and workers is sufficiently high. One implication of
this result is that, as soon as a coalition of capitalists and low-skilled workers if formed, an equilibrium level
of redistribution is chosen by poor, rather than by middle class agents.
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Figure 8: Majority coalitions and political outcomes in the case of different workers preferences (numerical
example)
4 Extensions
In this section we check the robustness of results to the changes of several assumptions. Firstly, an imperfect
commitment case is considered. We also analyze a model with heterogeneous projects, which provides a
smooth effect of an increase in the tax rate on investment rates and economic growth.
4.1 Imperfect commitment case
One of the assumptions of the model is that a majority coalition gives a credible commitment do not change
the profit tax rate (⌧ ) after the realization of all projects. There is a dynamic inconsistency problem: as soon
as investment projects are realized, the majority, consisting of all workers, prefer to set the maximum tax rate
( ). Suppose now that there is a positive probability ⇢ that the tax rate will be reconsidered in the end of the
period. Thus, the model has the following timing:
1. the entry regime (B,NB) and a tax rate ⌧ are chosen in the political process;
2. A patent race between incumbents and new entrants occurs;
3. Firms produce goods and pay wages;
4. The profit tax rate is revised by the majority of agents with a probability ⇢;
5. All producers decide whether to hide profits;
6. The redistribution and consumption occurs.
As soon as investment projects are realized all workers prefer to chose the maximum redistribution
rate ( ). Therefore, an expected profit tax rate for firms equals
⌧ e = ⌧an(1  ⇢) + ⇢ , (20)
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where ⌧an is the announced tax rate at the beginning of the period. New entrants invest in new projects only
if
  (1  ⌧e)  c   0. (21)
From (20) and (21) the announced threshold level of taxes is redefined as
⌧ 0an = [1  c/(  )  ⇢ ]/(1  ⇢) (22)
As soon as the commitment to set a low tax rate is imperfect a majority coalition has to announce a lower
level of tax rate, than in the base-line model, in order to guarantee that the expected tax rate will not exceed
the threshold level. For high ⇢, such that
⇢ > [1  c/(  )]/  (23)
⌧ 0an becomes negative and so, the expected tax rate is so high that the NB-regime does not exist at all. The
NB-regime exists only if
c    (1  ⇢ ). (24)
The preferences of capitalists and workers, regarding to the entry regime and the tax rate ⌧e rest unchanged.
Therefore, if condition (24) holds the results of the previous analysis of political equilibrium also do not
change. In the opposite case, the democratization does not lead to the elimination of the entry barriers, as the
politics of a low tax rate are not credible.
4.2 The case of heterogeneous investment projects
In the previous analysis we assume that all investment projects are identical. Therefore, there is a threshold
tax rate ⌧ 0 which is the same for all projects, such that for higher tax rate investments become zero. In this
subsection we consider the case, when the projects have the different rate of return, and so, the rise in the tax
rate will decrease the number of existing investment project, and lowers the future economic growth rates,
but not drastically. This case is more realistic, but also is more complex for analysis.
Let suppose now that incumbents firms differ in their profit level. The incumbent firm i gets a
profit ⇡(i). The costs of investment c(i) also differ across industries and are distributed uniformly between
[0, cmax]. For the purpose of tractability, we assume that the innovation project costs differ between indus-
tries, but not within industries. That means, that incumbents and new entrants face the same c(i) in the
identical sector.
The timing of the model is as follows:
• Agents make political decisions about the level of entry barriers and the profit tax rate. We assume that
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this decision cannot be renegotiated during the current period.
• The information about the research costs c(i) is revealed for each industry,
• Incumbent firms make investment decisions,
• Potential entrants make investment decisions,
• Investment projects are realized,
• All producers make a decision whether to hide profits at the costs  ⇡(i),
• The redistribution and consumption occurs.
In the B-regime potential entrants are absent and incumbents invest in the new project only if the net
gain from this investment is positive. In the one-period model the net gain from the project is simply the
expected profit at the end of the period minus the costs of the project.
 (1  ⌧)  c(i)   1  ⌧. (25)
Rearranging the items, we get the threshold level of project costs (cB). If c(i)  cB the incumbent makes
investments the in B-regime, where
cB = (    1)(1  ⌧). (26)
In the NB-regime new entrants invest in projects only if incumbents chose not to invest and if
  (1  ⌧)  c(i)   0, (27)
Therefore, there is another threshold rate of the costs of the projects (cNB), such that for c(i) < cNB new
entrants make investment in new projects. As previously, we assume that
  > 1  1/  (28)
and so cB  cNB . Therefore, barriers to entry influence firm behavior in industries with intermediate costs
cB  c(i)  cNB . As in the basic model, in the NB-regime incumbents always use their first-mover
advantage to invest in projects. The income per capita growth is equal to the technological progress growth
rate. Initially all industries are symmetric, after the innovation profits and value added increase by  . For
uniform distribution of innovation costs from 0 to cmax the expected growth rates for each regime of barriers
to entry is determined as
gBa = (    1)2(1  ⌧)/cmax, (29)
and
gNBa = (    1)  (1  ⌧)/cmax. (30)
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The crucial feature of this version of the model is that the profit tax rate impedes innovations in both economic
regimes. This is the traditional distortional effect of redistribution (Person, Tabellini (1992)). The higher tax
rate decreases economic growth as it lowers the private benefits from innovation activities and so leads to a
drop in innovation efforts. At the same time, from assumption 1 it follows that given the tax rate the NB-
regime is more pro-growth gNBa > gBa , as the elimination of barriers to entry stimulate innovations through
the competition effect.
Let us now determine agents pay-offs in the two-dimensional policy space {J,⌧ J}, where J 2
{B,NB}, ⌧J 2 [0, 1].
The capitalists’ expected pay-off in the B-regime equals
V Bc = (
Z cB
0
[ (1  ⌧)  c(i)]⇡dc(i) +
Z cmax
cB
[(1  ⌧)⇡]dc(i))/cmax, (31)
After calculations we get
V Bc = ⇡(1  ⌧ + (    1)2(1  ⌧)2/(2cmax)), (32)
Capitalists expected pay-off in the NB-regime equals:
V NBc = (
Z cNB
0
[ (1  ⌧)  c(i)]⇡dc(i) +
Z cmax
cNB
[(1  ⌧)⇡]dc(i))/cmax, (33)
(33) can be represented as
V NBc = ⇡[1  ⌧ +   (1  ⌧)2( /2  1)/cmax] (34)
From (32),(34) for the given tax rate capitalists always prefer the B-regime to the NB-regime. Only for ⌧ = 1
capitalists are indifferent between two regimes. The bliss point for the capitalists is (B, 0).
Worker pay-offs depend on their individual skills level (hk). Let b be a Boolean variable which equals
    1 in B-regime and    in NB-regime. Then for a sub-group k, the workers payoff equals
Vk = whk[1 + (    1)b(1  ⌧)/cmax] + Tr, (35)
where Tr = ⌧⇡(1 + (    1)b(1   ⌧)/cmax)N/L for ⌧    and equals zero for ⌧ >  . As output increases
by a factor of   in the NB-regime, wage, tax collection and transfer payments also increase by the same size.
The next proposition follows:
Proposition 3. 1) For the given tax rate ⌧ all workers prefer the NB-regime to the B-regime.
2) For the given entry regime workers preferences are single-peaked in the one-dimensional tax space.
3) In the B-regime workers become more pro-redistributive. That is, for each worker j given the entry regime
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there are two bliss points, (B,⌧ Bj ) and (NB,⌧NBj ) and ⌧Bj   ⌧NBj .
Proof. The proposition follows directly from the properties of the pay-off function (35). In the NB-regime
for the given tax rate, the increase in competition leads to a higher rate of investment in new projects and
increases workers pay-off through the effect on economic growth rates. The function Vw(⌧) has one global
maximum ⌧⇤j , and is increasing for ⌧ < ⌧⇤j and is decreasing for ⌧ > ⌧⇤j . The level ⌧⇤j depends on the
parameters of the model, such as the relative skills of worker j, the size of innovations and the ratio of total
profits to total wages(↵).
All workers prefer the NB-regime to the B-regime as the free entry regime enhances competition and
provides a higher pace of technological adoption, and, hence, a growth in wages. At the same time, low
skilled workers have smaller gains from the high pace of innovation, therefore, they prefer a no-entry high
redistribution regime to the free-entry low-redistribution case. As in the baseline model capitalists can also
prefer the no-entry regime with high-redistribution rate to the free-entry regime with low redistribution rate.
Proposition 4. In the model with heterogeneous firms if   < L/N there are two possible scenarios
1) The majority core voting equilibrium (NB,⌧NBmedian) exists and unique. This is the NB-regime with the tax
rate, which is proffered by the median voter.
2) The majority core voting equilibrium does not exist because of the cycling problem.
Proof. Let’s define ⌧⇤NB as the tax rate which is supported by the median voter in the NB-regime. Now we
can find the conditions under which (NB,⌧ ⇤NB) is the majority core voting equilibrium. As the preferences of
all agents are single-peaked in one-dimensional policy space of rate of taxes From the median voter theorem
there is no other policy (NB,⌧NB), which will be preferred by the majority of votes. At the same time,
the policy (B,⌧B) with a higher tax rate could be supported by a majority coalition of low skilled workers
and capitalists. If it is true the stability conditions will not be satisfied. The (B,⌧B) is always worse, than
(NB,⌧B) for all workers, and the policy (NB,⌧B) will always worse, than (NB,⌧ ⇤NB) for the majority of
workers from the median voter theorem. Therefore, there is a cycling problem and no equilibria exists in this
case.
In the model with heterogeneous firms the same factors influence the existence and stability of free-
entry equilibrium in democracy. If the human capital level is sufficiently low and human capital distribution
is highly skewed the free-entry equilibrium becomes unstable as low-skilled workers and capitalists will vote
for a no-entry equilibrium with a high redistribution rate. At the same time, in the heterogeneous project case,
the no-entry equilibria with high redistribution rate is unstable, and we need to add additional restrictions on
the process of coalition formation to guarantee the stability of the no-entry equilibrium.
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5 Conclusion
In this chapter we show that more equal distribution of political rights does not obviously lead to the sup-
pression of barriers to entry. If voters chose both the level of redistribution and the barriers to entry de-
mocratization always leads to an increase in income redistribution, however, it decreases entry barriers in
goods markets only under certain conditions, which includes a high average level of skills, a low inequality in
pre-tax income between capitalists and workers and a low inequality of skills between workers. Under these
conditions there is a majority of voters, which consists of all workers, supporting a free-entry regime. De-
mocratization in countries with a low initial level of education and high inequality in wealth and skills results
in the populistic policies, supporting by the coalition of capitalists and low-skilled workers. In this case, the
middle class consisting of high-skilled workers becomes a political outsider. This argument is particularly
relevant for countries with deep historical roots of wealth inequality and inequality of opportunities, as well
as for countries relying on the export of natural resources.
One argument, that we do not consider in our baseline model, is the possibility of the endogenous
choice of education policies. Saint-Paul, Verdier (1992) show that democracy can provide redistribution in
the form of education subsidies, which are beneficial for economic growth. In our view, a final result will
depend on the effect of the education policy on the inequality of incomes within workers. If the gain from
education subsidies will be concentrated in the hands of the middle class (like in Ferna´ndez and Rogerson
(1995), Veselov (2012)) a winning coalition of capitalists and low-skilled workers will be stable. Moreover,
a change in skills distribution is a long process, and, therefore, the benefits from the education policy could
be provided only in the long-run.
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Appendix A. The general equilibrium set-up
Let us consider a quality-ladders model, which is based on the model of Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
Assume that there is a single general good, produced by labor and specialized intermediate inputs, according
to the following production function
Y = (H/N)1 ↵
NX
0
A(i)1 ↵x(i)↵. (36)
where Y is the output of the general good,H is the quantity of skill-adjusted labor engaged in production and
x(i) is the quantity of intermediate input i, A(i) is the current quality of intermediate input i,N measures the
number of intermediate inputs, and 1  ↵ is the share of labor income in the total output of the general good.
The general good can be used interchangeably as consumption or an input in intermediate goods production
or R&D input 9. Producers of the general good are perfect competitors on all markets, so the equilibrium
price of intermediate inputs px(i) is equals to the marginal product in producing the general good
px(i) = ↵A(i)
1 ↵(H/N)1 ↵x(i)↵ 1. (37)
We assume that the production of each particular type of intermediate inputs is performed by an unconstrained
monopolistic firm 10 that uses one unit of the general good to produce one unit of input. Thus a monopolistic
firm maximizes its profit by choosing the level of production of intermediate inputs
max{px(i)x(i)  x(i)}. (38)
In this case from the monopolist problem the equilibrium price is equal to
px(i) = 1/↵. (39)
From equations (37) and (39) the equilibrium quantity x(i) equals
x(i) = ↵2/1 ↵A(i)H/N. (40)
Substituting equation (40) into (36) we obtain the equilibrium output of the general good
Y = ↵
2↵
1 ↵AH, (41)
9For this type of the production function the number of varieties of intermediate inputs (N) does not influence workers productivity
because of the increased specialization effect. A higher number of varieties increases the specialization costs, which eliminate the
positive direct effect on the output (see f.e. Bucci, 2009)
10The alternative assumption about the competitive fringe in each intermediate input sector does not influence the results
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where A is the average quality of intermediate inputs engaged in production. Therefore, the growth rate of
the final output per capita equals the rate of technological progress, which is measured by the average quality
of intermediate inputs plus the rate of human capital accumulation. From (39) and (40) the level of profit for
each monopolist equals
⇡(i) = (1  ↵)↵ 1+↵1 ↵A(i)H. (42)
The level of profits is proportional to the aggregate level of skills and to the level of technology. In a compet-
itive labor market the wage rate equals the marginal product of labor
w = ↵2↵/(1 ↵)A. (43)
The equilibrium output of the general good can be divided by wages, monopolistic profits and inputs in the
intermediate goods production sector
Y = wH +
NX
0
[⇡(i) + x(i)]. (44)
where w is skill-adjusted wage rate. At the same time, from (36), (42), (43) the shares of wages and profits
in the final output are constant
wH = (1  ↵)Y, (45)
NX
i=0
⇡(i) = ↵(1  ↵)Y, (46)
and the ratio of total profits to total wages equals ↵. The wage rate per unit of skills, and profits is proportional
to the level of technology. The rise of the level of technology by   increases by the same size the wages and
profits. In the baseline model the costs of the investment project in terms of the general good is proportional
to the current level of technology, c0A(i), where c0 > 0. From (42) we redefine the costs of the project as
c⇡(i), where
c = c0N/(H(1  ↵)↵ 1+↵1 ↵ ). (47)
Therefore, a higher level of average skills (h = H/L) leads to a decrease of the relative costs of the project
(c).
Appendix B. Proof of the Proposition 2
1) If c <   (1    ), then, by the definition of ⌧ 0, ⌧ 0 >   and all workers prefer (NB, ), which is a stable
political outcome.
23
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.04
2.1) For ⌧ 0 <   let us check firstly if (NB,⌧ 0) is a political equilibrium or not. All workers always
prefer (NB,⌧ 0) to the (NB, ⌧ <⌧ 0) and (B, ⌧ <⌧ 0). Thus, the only other potential policy that could be
supported by the majority of voters is (B, ⌧ >⌧ 0). As (NB,⌧ 0) is a bliss point for relatively high skilled
workers, only capitalists and low-skilled workers could form a coalition to overcome (NB,⌧ 0). This is the
case if
8>>><>>>:
⌧B   
Vc{NB,⌧ 0} < Vc{B,⌧B}
Vkm{NB,⌧ 0} < Vkm{B,⌧B},
(48)
where km is a sub-group of workers who have a maximum level of skills and at the same time belong to the
majority coalition of low-skilled workers with capitalists.
(48) is rewritten as
8>>><>>>:
⌧B <  
(1  ⌧B) >  (1  ⌧ 0)  c
whkm + ⌧B⇡N/L >  [whkm + ⇡N⌧ 0/L]
(49)
Dividing both sides of the last inequality by wh we rewrite the system (49) as
8>>><>>>:
⌧B <  
⌧B < 1 + c   (1  ⌧ 0)
⌧B > hkm(    1)/(h↵) +  ⌧ 0
(50)
From (50) there is a policy (B,⌧B), which is strictly preferred to (NB,⌧ 0) by the majority, consisting
of capitalists and low-skilled workers, only if the following conditions are satisfied8<:hkm(    1)/(h↵) +  ⌧ 0 <  hkm(    1)/(h↵) < 1 + c    (51)
Therefore, only for   >  1 and condition (18) (NB,⌧ 0) is not majority core voting equilibrium. Let
us note that if (18) holds it is straightforward to see that  1 is always lesser than  2.
2.2) Let us prove now that if (18) holds and if   >  2, then a majority core equilibrium does not exist.
If (18) holds, (NB,⌧ 0) is always dominated by (B,⌧B > ⌧ 0), where ⌧B satisfies (23). At the same time from
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(50) ⌧B <  2 <  . In this case (B,  ) is always preferable to (B,⌧B <  ) by all workers. However, from
the pay-offs definition (NB,⌧ 0) is better than (B,   >  2) for the majority consisting of high-skilled workers
and capitalists. Thus, there is a cycling problem and no stable political equilibrium exists.
2.3) Let us show that if (50) does not hold the majority core voting equilibrium (NB,⌧ 0) is unique.
The policy (J, ⌧ <⌧ 0) cannot be a political equilibrium as all workers strictly prefer (NB,⌧ ‘). The policy
(B,⌧B > ⌧ ‘) is not also an equilibrium as, as soon as the conditions (50) are not satisfied, there is always a
strict majority of voters among workers, who strictly prefer (NB,⌧ ‘).
References
1. Acemoglu D. Robinson J.A.,2005. Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
2. Acemoglu, D., 2008, Oligarchic versus democratic societies. Journal of the European Economic Asso-
ciation 6(1), 1-44.
3. Acemoglu D. Robinson J.A.,2008, Persistence of Power, Elite and Institutions. American Economic
Review, 98:1, 267-293
4. Acemoglu D., Naidu S., Restrepo P., Robinson J.F., 2014, Democracy does Cause Growth. NBER
Working Paper 20004.
5. Alesina A.,Rodrik D. 1994. Distributive Politics and Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics. 1994. Vol. 1.02. No 2. . 465-490.
6. Aghion, P., Howitt P, 1998. Endogenous growth theory. The MIT press.
7. Aghion, P., Alesina A., and Trebbi F. 2007. Democracy, technology, and growth, June, National Bureau
of Economic Research, Inc.
8. Barro. R. 1996. Democracy and growth. Journal of Economic Growth. 1. 1-27.
9. Bernasconi M., Profeta P. 2012. Public education and redistribution when talents are mismatched.
European Economic Review 56 (2012) 84-96
10. Bucci A. 2011. Product varieties, Population, Competition and Growth. DEGIT Conference Papers
c016 006.
11. Djankov S., La Porta R., Lopez-De-Silanes F. Shleifer A., 2002. The Regulation Of Entry. The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37, February.
25
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.04
12. Djankov, S, 2008. The Regulation of Entry: A Survey. CEPR Discussion Papers 7080, C.E.P.R.
Discussion Papers
13. Ferna´ndez R., Rogerson R. 1995. On the Political-Economy of Education Subsidies. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies. 62(2). pp. 249-62
14. Ferna´ndez R., Levy G. Diversity and Redistribution. Journal of Public Economics 92 (2008) 925-943.
15. Howitt, P., Mayer-Foulkes D., 2005, R&d, implementation, and stagnation: A schumpeterian theory of
convergence clubs, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 37(1), 147-177.
16. Krusell, Per, and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, 1996, Vested interests in a positive theory of stagnation and
growth, Review of Economic Studies 63(2), 301-329.
17. Levy G. 2005. The politics of public provision of education. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(4),
1507-1534.
18. McKelvey R.D., Wendell R.E. 1976. Voting Equilibria in Multidimensional Choice Spaces. Mathe-
matics of Operational Research. Vol.1. No.2. pp. 144-157
19. Meltzer, A. H., and S. F. Richard, 1981, A rational theory of the size of government, Journal of Political
Economy 89(5), 914-927.
20. Polterovich V. Popov V. 2005. Democracy and Growth Reconsidered: Why Economic Performance of
New Democracies is not Encouraging. MPRA paper 21606
21. Parente, S.L., and R. Zhao. 2006. Slow development and special interests. International Economic
Review 47:991-1011.
22. Prescott, E. C., and S. L. Parente, 1999, Monopoly rights: A barrier to riches, American Economic
Review 89(5), 1216-1233.
23. Persson T. and G. Tabellini. 1994. Is Inequality Harmful for Growth. The American Economic Review
Vol. 84, No. 3 (Jun.), pp. 600-621
24. Saint-Paul G. Verdier T. 1992. Education, Democracy and Growth Journal of Development Economics.
42. pp. 399-407.
25. Schumpeter I. 1943. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Edition published in the Taylor Francis
e-Library in 2003.
26. Scervini F. 2012. Empirics of the median voter: democracy, redistribution and the role of the middle
class. Journal of Economic Inequality. 10:529-550
27. Veselov D.A. 2012. Political Equilibrium and Social Optimum in the Economy with Two Types of
Redistribution. HSE Economic Journal. 2012. . 16. 3. C. 341 - 367
26
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.04
28. Veselov D. A. 2013. Redistribution and the political support of free entry policy in the Schumpete-
rian model with heterogenous agents / Working papers by Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne. Series
cesdoc:13050 ”Documents de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne”. No. 2013.50
27
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.04
